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Decentralized Bargaining 
in a  Globalizing Industry
The Automotive Assembly Industry in Australia
RUSSELL D. LANSBURY
CHRIS F. WRIGHT
MARIAN BAIRD1*
This paper examines the impact of enterprise bargaining on 
employment relations practices in the Australia automotive assembly 
sector in the context of the globalization of the industry. While there 
has been convergence towards lean production principles among 
the four auto assemblers, arising from global trends, there has also 
been divergence resulting from enterprise bargaining, among other 
variables. Strong similarities are apparent between the companies 
in areas such as work organization, skill formation and enterprise 
governance, whereas there are differences in remuneration and 
staffing practices. However, it remains to be seen whether decen-
tralized bargaining will continue to yield greater differentiation 
in employment relations among the automotive manufacturers in 
an increasingly globalized industry.
The automotive manufacturing industry has played an important role in 
the development of the Australian economy. It accounts for nearly six per 
cent of the total value added for manufacturing, making it one of the largest 
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manufacturing sectors, and is among Australia’s most significant export 
industries (DISR, 2005). The sector comprises several hundred component 
suppliers and four vehicle assemblers—Ford, GM-Holden, Mitsubishi and 
Toyota—the first two being American-owned and the latter two being 
Japanese-owned. GM-Holden and Mitsubishi have assembly plants located 
in Adelaide, South Australia, where manufacturing has historically been a 
centrepiece of the local economy. Ford and Toyota’s assembly operations 
are situated in Melbourne, Victoria, where the economy is more diversified. 
GM-Holden also has an engine manufacturing plant in Melbourne.
The increasingly competitive nature of the automotive industry on 
a global scale, declining profits and a decrease in the ratio of exports to 
imports in the Australian industry have prompted governments, manufac-
turers and unions to examine ways to make the industry more efficient. 
The dismantling of tariffs by governments over the past two decades has 
exposed local automotive producers to greater import competition. One 
consequence has been Australian manufacturers shifting the focus away 
from the local market and towards overseas markets, particularly the Middle 
East. Nonetheless, while the value of exports by Australian producers has 
increased over the past decade, this pales in significance compared to the 
growth in imports (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1
Value and Growth of Automotive Imports and Exports for Selected Years 
(in $B Australian)
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Imports 5.45 7.36 10.69 14.96 18.54
Exports 1.04 1.47  2.26  3.25  4.83
Source: Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR). 2000. Key 
 Automotive Statistics 1999. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, tables 18 and 
22; Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR). 2003. Key Automotive 
Statistics 2002. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, tables 14 and 18.
The relative share of the vehicle market in Australia since the early 
1990s has declined for all local assemblers except Toyota, which accounted 
for almost 25 per cent of all vehicles sold in 2002. The proportion of locally 
produced vehicles sold in Australia has declined steadily from 68 per cent 
in 1991 to 41 per cent in 2003. The decline in Mitsubishi’s share of the 
local market has been so severe that its long-term viability (under its new 
owner Daimler Chrysler) continues to be uncertain and in 2004, one of its 
plants was closed. Ford and GM-Holden have also witnessed significant 
reductions in their share of the Australian vehicle market (see Table 2).
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TABLE 2
Total Market Share for All Vehicles Sold for Selected Years (%)
1993 1996 1999 2002
Toyota 21.9 18.6 19.5 24.4
GM-Holden 17.4 19.2 19.7 12.7
Ford 20.9 20.3 16.1 12.6
Mitsubishi 13.7  9.4  8.9  7.4
Other Imported 
Vehicles 26.1 32.5 35.8 42.9
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: DISR. 2000. Key Automotive Statistics 1999. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, table 3; DISR. 2001. Key Automotive Statistics. Canberra:  Commonwealth 
of Australia, table 3; DITR. 2002. Key Automotive Statistics 2001. Canberra: 
 Commonwealth of Australia, table 6; DITR. 2003. Key Automotive Statistics 2002.
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, table 6.
Another important change which has affected the Australian automotive 
industry during the past decade has been the shift from a predominately 
centralized system of industrial relations to a more decentralized form of 
enterprise bargaining. This involves direct negotiation between employers 
and their employees. In the auto industry, most employees are unionized, 
and the unions negotiate enterprise agreements on their behalf. Enterprise 
bargaining agreements (EBAs) are underpinned by awards, which are 
 generally established on an occupational or industry-wide basis. 
This paper examines how the auto assembly sector has responded to
the dual pressures of increasing globalization and decentralized bargaining.
The paper begins by discussing the methodological approach used in 
 analyzing changes in the Australian automotive sector. The literature 
review indicates how this research relates to contemporary debates sur-
rounding variations in employment relations. The focus of our paper 
examines changes in employment relations among the four Australian 
automotive assemblers focusing on the themes of bargaining structures, 
work organization, staffing, skill formation, wages and remuneration, and 
enterprise governance. In conclusion, the impact on employment relations 
of decentralized bargaining at the national level on a globalize industry is 
evaluated.
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METHODOLOGY
At the time of writing, awards were used to set minimum standards for 
a maximum of 20 specific employment matters as defined by the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996. Enterprise agreements, which exist in conjunction with 
awards, are not allowed to undercut the provisions contained in an award, 
but can cover a much broader range of provisions. Unlike awards, which 
can be amended at any time by agreement between the parties or through 
arbitration by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), 
enterprise agreements must be renegotiated at least every three years. Rather 
unusually, the awards applying to the automotive assembly sector are in 
essence “enterprise awards”, with each company having its own award.
In conducting this study, a content analysis was undertaken of all of 
the EBAs that were certified by the AIRC between 1992 and 2004 for 
the Ford, Toyota, GM-Holden and Mitsubishi assembly plants, the three 
Adecco agreements that have been certified since 1999 covering  Mitsubishi
employees, as well as the enterprise awards of the four automotive 
 assemblers since 1988. By examining the awards applicable to the auto-
motive assembly sector as well as enterprise agreements, this paper seeks 
to avoid the criticism of Bray and Waring (2005) that studies focusing on 
labour regulation have tended to disregard the “horizontal complexity” of 
regulatory instruments. Such analysis is necessary as the existence of dual 
regulation through awards and agreements is fundamental in understanding 
the rather complicated nature of employment regulation in the Australian 
automotive assembly sector. Figure 1 shows the complexity of regulation 
in the industry by listing each award and enterprise agreement for each 
company by year since 1992. 
FIGURE 1
Duration on Automotive Assembly Sector EBAs, Since 1992
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Mitsubishi-Adecco
Mitsubishi
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Ford Ford EBA 
1993
Ford EBA 
1995
Ford EBA 1997 Ford EBA 2000 Ford EBA 2003
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EBA 1992
GM-Holden EBA 
1995
GM-Holden EBA 
1998
GM-Holden EBA 
2001
Toyota EBA 
1992
Toyota 
EBA  1994
Toyota 
EBA 1995
Toyota EBA 
1996
Toyota EBA 
1999
Toyota EBA 2002
Mitsubishi 
EBA 1992
Mitsubishi 
EBA 1993
Mitsubishi EBA 
1995
Mitsubishi EBA 
1998
Mitsubishi EBA 
2001
Mitsubishi-Adecco 
EBA 1999
Mitsubishi-Adecco 
EBA 2002
Mitsubishi 
EBA 2004
Mitsubishi-Adecco 
EBA 2005
GM-Holden EBA 
2004
Toyota EBA 2005
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The analysis involved examining the clauses of agreements and awards 
according to the framework used in a previous study (cf. Kitay and Lansbury, 
1997). Some minor adjustments were made to this framework in accordance 
with structures associated with enterprise bargaining in Australia. This 
resulted in the content analysis being structured around five broad themes, 
each of which encompasses various sub-categories: “work organization” 
entails job structures and demarcation, the structure of teams and working 
hours; “staffing arrangements” includes methods of staffing adjustment, 
such as redundancy and precarious forms of employment; “skill formation”
covers themes including industry standards on skills and training; “wages 
and remuneration” encompasses themes such as wage outcomes, wage deter-
mination and performance-based pay arrangements; and “enterprise govern-
ance” covers such themes as union involvement, committees,  consultation 
arrangements and other forms of employee involvement. 
The analysis of enterprise agreements and awards was supplemented 
by over 40 in-depth interviews with management representatives, full-time 
union officials, union delegates, team leaders and rank-and-file employees 
from the automotive assembly sector. A number of the people that were 
interviewed later provided feedback on our preliminary findings. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A number of studies have examined continuity and change in 
 employment relations relevant to our research. Debates about whether 
 globalization results in convergence or divergence in systems of  employment 
relations stem from the original work of Kerr et al. (1960), who argued that 
industrialization—or more specifically, technology and market competi-
tion arising from industrialization—resulted in a convergence of national 
systems of industrial relations at an institutional level around “principles 
of pluralistic industrialism”. In response to Kerr et al., a plethora of studies 
sought to either extend or challenge their convergence thesis (cf. Bamber, 
Lansbury and Wailes, 2004). A number of these studies have been specific 
to the automotive sector. 
In an influential book on the auto industry, The Machine that Changed 
the World, Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) argued that international 
 competitive pressures would lead to convergence on “best practice” or “the 
one best way”, irrespective of the company’s ownership or national identity. 
In their view, the lean production system developed by the Toyota Motor 
Company not only transformed the method of producing motor vehicles, 
but also the means by which employees were managed.1 Any firm that 
1.  Lean production is based on a system developed by the Toyota Motor Company to 
 create a more flexible, demand-oriented process. Its principles include an integrated 
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failed to adopt lean production would fall by the wayside in an increasingly 
competitive world market. Yet critics of the study by Womack, Jones and 
Roos argued that employment practices are shaped not in a deterministic 
fashion by a single global technological or economic imperative but by a 
multiplicity of factors. 
Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie (1997) found that while lean 
 production principles were diffused to automotive plants around the world, 
the patterns of adoption were not of a single character. Rather, important 
variations reflected the effects of institutional and cultural forces as well as 
differences in the strategies and the power of the parties involved. From their 
case studies, Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie reported a trend towards 
convergence across countries combined with divergence across and within 
companies. Hence, although convergence existed around matters of principle 
(such as the desirability of lean production), diversity prevailed in the ways 
these were translated into practice. 
Based on their research into automotive and telecommunications indus-
tries, Katz and Darbishire (2000) coined the term “converging  divergences” 
to describe a common set of changes in employment relations taking 
place in a range of developed market economies, such as decentralization 
of bargaining and individualization of relations between employers and 
employees. They attributed particular importance to the shared experience 
of increasing diversity in employment relations. However, they also argued 
that institutional differences across countries resulted in variations in the 
distribution of employment relations patterns in each country. Despite 
evidence of divergence between national employment relations systems, 
Katz and Darbishire (2000: 281) also emphasized that, “the persistence 
of sizeable country differences in the relative mix of various employment 
patterns, and the role that national level institutions play in shaping that 
mix, suggest a continuing influential role for national employment-related 
institutions”.
Similarly, Locke (1992) attributed national socio-economic conditions 
and the politics of strategic choice—that is, the ways that actors such as 
employers and unions are able to shape employment relations in response 
to industrial change—as factors that explain intra-national variation in 
employment relations. Specifically, Locke argues that the relative power 
and organizational capacities of the parties, the ideological dispositions of 
managers and union leaders and the influence of other local factors and 
institutions will have an effect on the response of employers and unions 
and other actors to industrial change.
simple piece production flow with small batches made just-in-time, an emphasis on defect 
 prevention rather than rectification, team-based work organization and close buyer-
 supplier  relationships.
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In the context of previous research on whether external market 
 competition results in convergence or divergence of employment relations 
systems, this paper seeks to explain how employment relations in the 
Australian automotive assembly sector have changed, both between and 
within firms, over time. In doing so, we attempt to isolate the extent to which 
the strategic choices available to employers, unions and governments, as 
well as institutional and structural factors, have shaped the direction that 
this change has taken. 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Since 1991, both Labor and Liberal-National governments have 
 encouraged enterprise bargaining, marking a major shift away from a more 
centralized approach to employment relations (cf. Kitay and Lansbury, 
1997). However, there is still an element of external regulation in the auto-
motive sector and more generally, across the industrial relations system. 
The AIRC, a tribunal established by the Commonwealth Government at 
the turn of the twentieth century (then under a different name), continues 
to have the power to settle disputes through conciliation and arbitration, to 
certify enterprise agreements and to establish minimum standards across 
the workforce (cf. Bray et al., 2005).2 The continuing role of the AIRC has 
meant that the legacy of external regulation continues to have an influence 
in the automotive assembly sector, as do other “third parties” such as trade 
unions.
Over the last two decades, there has been a significant decline in the 
proportion of workers in Australia that are members of trade unions, falling
from 49 per cent in 1982 to 23 per cent in 2002 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, cited in Bray et al., 2005: 202). Despite this decline, unions in 
the automotive sector have maintained high levels of membership, which 
has meant that they continue to wield considerable power in automotive 
employment relations. Among the vehicle producers (and large component 
suppliers) there is almost 100 per cent union coverage below the managerial 
levels of the workforce. 
The trade union that covers most employers in the automotive  industry 
is the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU), which was 
 augmented in 1995 through an amalgamation of several  manufacturing-
based unions. While there are several other unions covering clerical 
2. However, the influence of the AIRC looks set to be reduced after the Commonwealth 
Government introduced the WorkChoices legislation in 2005 which seeks to overhaul 
existing regulatory arrangements and curtail the power of third parties over the employ-
ment relationship (Ellem et al., 2005).
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 workers and electrical tradespersons, the AMWU represents about 90 per 
cent of unionized employees, with its Vehicle Division covering around 
70 per cent of waged employees in the sector. The sentiment among 
 employees interviewed for this study is that there is widespread support for 
the AMWU, although some members expressed the view that their union 
should have pressed companies harder to raise skill levels and expand 
career opportunities for the workforce. There also remain differences 
between the Vehicle and Metal divisions of the AMWU over the issue of 
allowing production workers to move into maintenance and trades areas of 
work. Disputes in the industry have been increasing since the late 1990s 
as employers seek to achieve greater labour flexibility and productivity 
improvements through enterprise bargaining (see Table 3). Despite this, 
according to management and union officials in the industry, relations 
between the parties are generally amicable. 
TABLE 3
Number of Disputes and Employees Involved in Industrial Disputes in the 
Automotive Industry in Australia, 1991–2001
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Number of Disputes 10  8 10  3 18 19
Number of Employees directly 
or indirectly involved (000s)  5 13 10 10 21 16
Source: Productivity Commission. 2002. Review of Automotive Assistance: Inquiry 
Report. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 253. 
Although enterprise bargaining was not formally encouraged by 
 government until 1991, the vehicle assembly sector is unique in that a form 
of quasi-enterprise bargaining was introduced as early as 1973 when an 
industry-wide award was abandoned and replaced with enterprise awards 
for each of the main assemblers. Despite this leading to some divergence 
in the employment relations outcomes of the four automotive assemblers, 
as may be assumed, many similarities remained until enterprise bargaining 
was formally introduced.
Through the Federation of Vehicle Industry Unions, the AMWU and 
the other unions covering automotive workers coordinate their enterprise 
 bargaining strategies and industrial campaigns. This has led to some 
 uniformity in the outcomes of enterprise agreements among the four 
 automotive assemblers, leading the government to allege that unions have 
been engaging in “pattern bargaining” (cf. DEWR, 2002). There is also a 
large degree of coordination among the bargaining strategies of the automo-
tive manufacturers. While this coordination is not as tightly organized as it is 
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between the unions, the human resource executives of GM-Holden, Toyota, 
Ford and Mitsubishi meet regularly to discuss their bargaining strategies 
but without disclosing details, particularly when one of the companies is 
in the process of bargaining a new collective agreement. They also keep a 
close eye on the bargaining outcomes of their competitors. 
WORK ORGANIZATION
Largely due to the dominance of Toyota and its success in pioneering
“lean production”, all of the companies operating assembly plants in 
Australia have adopted a variant of the Toyota Production System
(cf. Kochan, Lansbury and MacDuffie, 1997). Each company has created 
its own hybrid system of production based on a combination of their own 
management philosophy and elements of lean production. The introduc-
tion of new production systems in assembly plants has had significant 
 implications for the way in which work is organized and how decisions 
are made about changes in the workplace. 
Senior managers among the ranks of its competitors acknowledge that 
Toyota’s success in implementing lean production means that it continues to 
set the benchmark for the industry. Indeed, Toyota’s enterprise agreements 
deal with provisions relating to production more comprehensively than the 
other assemblers, with its EBAs noting that formal, accredited training is 
provided to familiarize employees with the Toyota Production System. Ford 
and GM-Holden are also quite detailed in their discussion of production 
system arrangements, but this is not the case with Mitsubishi’s EBAs and 
awards, which are reflective of their status as having the least automated 
production arrangements of the four assemblers. 
Despite the long-established Toyota Production System, one union 
official claimed that the Ford had the “leanest” production system of the 
four assemblers, and a number of Toyota’s managers also conceded that 
its production techniques could be leaner. Greater use of technology and 
the introduction of “leaner” production methods have increased efficiency 
and production output across the four assemblers and raised the skill 
levels of employees. However, there is evidence from employees that the 
increased speed of the production line has had negative implications for 
work intensification and raised concerns about the potential elimination 
of jobs.
There have been significant changes to job structures and demarcation 
in the automotive industry in recent years: from 240 job classifications 
in the award, to only three non-trade levels and six trade levels. These 
reforms came about not through enterprise bargaining but rather through 
a government-led initiative in the late 1980s to restructure awards, which 
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interestingly was consistent with lean production principles. As a result 
of this process, all automotive assembly sector awards since 1988 have 
contained new classification structures setting out the job requirements in 
terms of competencies, qualifications, general duties and responsibilities for 
all non-salaried occupations, as reflected in the Toyota Award. Substantial 
efforts have been made in recent years to reduce demarcations between 
trade and non-trade employees. While a number of managers claim that 
there is greater scope for production workers to become trades workers, 
problems have started to re-emerge over the delineation of duties between 
trades workers and technicians. 
While the Toyota-style lean production system has been introduced 
in at least three of the four assemblers, consistent with earlier findings
(cf. Bamber and Lansbury, 1997), there is variation as far as to the way that 
team work, a key component of lean production, has been implemented. It 
is difficult to precisely define differences in the team systems of the four 
companies simply from the descriptions given in their EBAs, but field 
visits and interviews add much more depth to the picture. GM-Holden has 
implemented “work groups”, which follow a much more inclusive and 
democratic European model of workplace structuring, as distinguished from 
the “team work” model, used in some overseas General Motors operations, 
which is characterized by a more American and Japanese-based approach 
(Murakami, 1999: 117-120). Ford has introduced “natural work groups” 
and “integrated manufacturing teams”, which involve non-trade and trade 
employees working together as part of a cohesive work group. According 
to Toyota’s enterprise agreements, team work is included as part of the 
continuous improvement/kaizen and Toyota Production and Management 
Systems processes. While production at Mitsubishi is organized according 
to teams, employees claim that the effective utilization of team work is only 
operative to a limited degree. 
The Productivity Commission (1996: 117) claimed that “employees in 
many of the firms are now operating in small self-managed teams that are 
proving to be more productive than previous arrangements due to the higher 
motivation of employees”. However, according to a senior union official, 
the teams in some plants were more likely to lead to work intensification
and less employee autonomy than the team systems used elsewhere. There 
was a mixed response from managers in regards to the success of teams, 
with some claiming that there was still much scope for progress, and 
others claiming that teams were implemented inconsistently across the 
production line. According to one manager, teams on the assembly line 
have been ineffective and were gradually deteriorating, causing manage-
ment to reconsider their usefulness. Yet a number of employees expressed 
confidence in the effectiveness of the team system and felt that it provided 
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opportunities for participation in decision-making. Conversely, workers at 
one plant referred to the team systems as “unnatural work groups” because 
the company allocated each employee to a particular group and appointed 
group leaders. One employee said that this resulted in peer surveillance 
around issues such as absenteeism and quality.
The hours of work provisions are very similar across the four auto 
 assemblers and there have been only minor variations in these  conditions over 
recent years. A 38-hour week and a 19-day month are standard  throughout 
the industry, although Mitsubishi implemented a nine-day fortnight in 
 designated parts of their operations. There are also minor  differences between 
the companies in the provisions for employees to take off flexible rostered 
days. A number of recent enterprise agreements allow for the possibility of 
introducing more flexible shift arrangements through consultation with unions 
and employees. GM-Holden capitalized on this arrangement by introducing 
a third shift, when there was high demand for vehicles, thereby allowing the 
company to maintain continuous 24 hour production.
STAFFING PRACTICES
There has been a decline in the number of workers employed in the 
automotive industry since the early 1990s, within the vehicle manufactur-
ing sector and across the industry as a whole (see Table 4). The decision 
by Nissan to abandon its Australian operations in 1992 and the recent 
closure of one of Mitsubishi’s plants have contributed to this decline, but 
falling employment numbers is indicative of the increasing pressure on 
the Australian industry from import competition. One of the main ways 
that automotive manufacturers have sought to alleviate such pressures is 
through greater staffing flexibility, the use of non-full-time employment and 
reductions in employment levels. According to employees and managers, 
there is some antipathy towards the union from its members for “giving 
too much away” by allowing Mitsubishi to insert an “implementation of 
change” clause in its 2001 agreement. It was claimed that management 
at the company now has too much power to implement change, such as 
staffing flexibility.
In Australia, generally there has been a growth in the utilization of 
contingent or precarious forms of employment since the introduction
of award restructuring and decentralized bargaining in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s. This was subsequently reinforced through measures enacted by 
the Liberal/National government during the mid-1990s aimed at stimulating 
employment growth (Wailes and Lansbury, 1997: 5). While the number of 
full-time employees as a proportion of the total workforce stands at around 
70 per cent, this figure remains above 90 per cent for automotive industry. 
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Recent measures introduced by three of the major companies, however, 
have the potential to modify this trend.
Mitsubishi introduced a new employment arrangement in the late 1990s 
when it entered into agreement with labour hire firm Adecco to enable 
the company to hire “variable temporary labour”. Adecco thus became 
the employer of these workers rather than Mitsubishi. This strategy was 
enacted by Mitsubishi after the company warned the AMWU that unless 
labour flexibility was able to be utilized, the parent company might close 
its Australian operations. Mitsubishi’s arrangement with Adecco enabled 
it to introduce a form of numerical flexibility not available to the other 
manufacturers. Adecco hires workers out to other industries when they are 
not needed at Mitsubishi so that they continue to receive full pay. According 
to one Mitsubishi manager, this arrangement is “a classic case of where 
enterprise bargaining has been extremely beneficial for the company and the 
workforce”. The 1998 Mitsubishi agreement provided for a 15 per cent ratio 
of the total permanent workforce to be “variable temporary labour” (VTL). 
The 2001 EBA increased the maximum ratio of VTL in proportion to the 
total permanent workforce to 20 per cent, and redefined VTL to include 
“variable temporary casual labour” engaged by the hour and  “variable 
temporary labour weekly hire”. 
The 2005 Mitsubishi-Adecco agreement went further in pursuing 
innovative forms of flexibility. The agreement specifies that casual loading 
would be withheld from employees, who would receive an accrued  loading 
payment either at the end of their period of engagement with Adecco, or at 
the request on the employee in consultation with the company. This arrange-
ment would potentially overcome the problem of casual employees not 
having the paid leave entitlements of permanent employees. The agreement
also gave variable temporary casual employees the option of converting 
TABLE 4
Employment in the Automotive Industry in Australia
1990/91 1993/94 1996/97 1999/00
Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 27,500 22,559 20,330 16,519
Auto Component Manufacturing 23,900 20,841 21,868 22,422
Other Areas of Auto Manufacturing 11,900 10,515 12,054 15,547
Total 63,300 53,915 54,252 54,488
Source: DISR. 2000. Key Automotive Statistics 1999. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, table 27; DITR. 2003. Key Automotive Statistics 2002. Canberra: Com-
monwealth of Australia, table 22.
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to weekly hire status on either a full-time or part-time basis after being 
engaged for a continuous 12 month period. 
While Mitsubishi is the only assembler to have such an arrangement 
with a labour hire company, Toyota has introduced a system whereby 
 contract workers can be hired when a permanent worker takes leave of 
absence for more than four weeks. Furthermore, Toyota has been able to 
use its most recent EBA to gain more flexibility by hiring all production 
workers on a probationary period for the first six months of employment, 
after which time they are either made permanent or their employment ceases. 
GM-Holden has been able to use contractors for maintenance work but, like 
Toyota, this is not arranged through a labour hire company. GM-Holden 
has also increased the number of its “fixed term employees” in recent years 
and has been able to more extensively utilize part-time workers through its 
most recent enterprise agreement.
With the reduction of employment in the auto assembly industry over 
the past decade, provisions for redundancy and other job security issues 
have been increasingly prevalent in enterprise agreements. Indeed, job and 
income security have been major issues of contention in recent rounds of 
EBA negotiations. However, some union officials argue that the gains in 
redundancy provisions reflect many workers’ preference to take redundancy 
pay rather than fight to retain their jobs. For example, the union officials 
claim that many workers have been willing to accept redundancy follow-
ing the recent closure of one of the two Mitsubishi plants rather than seek 
relocation to the company’s remaining plant. 
This appears to be part of a broader strategy by the unions of shifting 
their focus from extending employees’ entitlements to protecting existing 
conditions through greater job security. While wages undoubtedly continue 
to be important, as evidenced by wage gains in recent bargaining rounds at 
GM-Holden and Toyota, the growing significance of job security to  workers 
in the industry is not surprising given the vulnerability of automotive 
assemblers in Australia to reductions in government protection and greater 
exposure to the global market. Redundancy packages were introduced by 
all of the companies in the early 1980s, but while the provisions relating to 
redundancy in the various enterprise agreements contain similarities, they 
are by no means uniform. The amount of redundancy pay and the options 
available for issues such as payment of entitlements, non-monetary benefits 
and alternatives to redundancy have changed notably over the past decade, 
and variation continues between the firms on these issues. This is also the 
case regarding union consultation.
The four assemblers have similar policies regarding the obligations of 
employers to consult unions over the utilization of precarious  employment, 
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including any plans by the companies to reduce the number of full-time 
 positions as a proportion of the total workforce. However, there are 
 disparities in the agreements concerning the companies’ obligations to 
consult employees and their unions over redundancies. While Ford is 
only compelled to notify unions of any plans regarding retrenchments, 
GM-Holden’s 2001 EBA states that it must “consult” with unions over 
such matters. Toyotas’ past two agreements have stated that compulsory 
separation conditions would be subject to further negotiations with unions. 
However, the EBAs of Mitsubishi are silent on this issue. Nonetheless, 
issues relating to job security are likely to be a continuing source of conflict 
between employers and unions, with the unions attempting to maintain some 
uniformity for their members in this regard.
SKILL FORMATION
Issues relating to skill formation have become increasingly important 
in the auto assembly industry. A Vehicle Industry Certificate (VIC) was 
introduced as part of the award restructuring process in the late 1980s, which 
linked pay levels to skills and comprised different levels for production work 
and the maintenance trades. Skill formation is thus an issue that is dealt 
with by awards, not enterprise agreements, and because the benchmark for 
skills is an industry-wide certificate, there is little variation between the 
assemblers on this matter. The VIC encompassed both on and off the job 
training and was intended to provide automotive workers with a “portable” 
qualification that would enable them to move between employers within the 
industry and gain recognition for skills acquired. The VIC has been revised 
in recent years and is currently known as Certificate II. According to workers 
and managers, the majority of employees across all four assemblers have 
completed or are in the process of completing VIC/Certificate II  training. 
The sentiment among union officials and shop-floor employees was that 
older workers were less enthusiastic than their younger counterparts about 
acquiring new skills through the VIC program.
There is a high degree of similarity between the automotive assemblers
in regard to pay based on skills, with all four companies introducing 
 different types of skills, qualification and training-related payments and 
allowances at various stages since the introduction of enterprise bargain-
ing. In terms of training, however, there has been some variation between 
the auto assemblers. Mitsubishi is the only assembler that does not have 
any provisions relating to occupational-specific training in its EBAs, but 
this issue is outlined in other documents agreed to between the union and
the company, thus demonstrating that agreements are not all-encompass-
ing in regulating employment relations in the sector. There were also other
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forms of training, covering issues such as quality, production,  maintenance
and temporary labour, which were only provided by one of the 
 assemblers.
WAGES AND REMUNERATION
The average wages of automotive assembly sector workers in Australia 
are 19 per cent higher those of the average manufacturing industry worker 
(Productivity Commission, 2002: 249). However, wages in the Australian 
automotive industry are well below those in other developed countries 
(see Table 5). Despite the advent of decentralized enterprise bargaining in 
1991, it has taken some time for inter-firm wage variation to take effect 
and even now, there are similar wage rates for assembly workers across 
the industry. The main disparity is between the more profitable companies, 
such as Toyota and GM-Holden, and the less profitable, such as Mitsubishi, 
where a widening gap has begun to emerge since 1999. For example, in 
2005, a production worker at Toyota was paid a weekly wage of $808.79, 
while a worker in the equivalent occupational grade at Mitsubishi received 
a weekly wage of $764.90 (see Table 6).
TABLE 5
Comparison of the Average Net Hourly Earnings of Automotive Workers
in Selected Developed Countries, 2003
Net wages (US$) Net wages (purchasing parity power) 
(€)
Australia  9.86  7.71
Canada 21.77 16.41
Denmark 29.63 20.69
France 15.66 10.74
Germany 35.97 28.41
Great Britain 17.64 11.37
Japan 20.26 10.09
Republic of Korea  9.40  6.89
USA 25.89 19.68
Source: International Metalworkers Federation. 2004. The Purchasing Power of 
Working Time: An International Comparison. IMF: Geneva.
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TABLE 6
Weekly Wage Rates ($A) for Australian Automotive Assembly Production 
Workers (selected years)
Toyota GM-Holden Ford Mitsubishi
1993 $457.68 $445.30 $455.80 $449.20
1995 $493.46 $491.20 $482.30 $483.50
1997 $564.90 $549.30 $539.30 $540.70
1999 $610.80 $608.50 $598.90 $593.50
2001 $681.72 $659.80 $661.80 $635.70
2003 $730.12 $737.40 $727.90 $696.20
2005 $808.79 $809.13 $806.30 $764.30
NB: Rates are for the highest wage available to production operators and are 
 consistent comparisons across all companies. Wage rates are applicable to those 
given to production operators on 1 January of each year.
The agreements and awards for all four automotive assemblers specify 
wage differentials to be paid to employees in accordance with their relevant
occupational grade and as appropriate to their skills and occupation. 
Employees in all of the companies receive additional pay if they are in the 
process of undertaking or have completed the VIC. Where there have been 
changes to wage differentials, the variations have been minor. All of the 
automotive companies, with the exception of Mitsubishi, have certified at 
least one enterprise agreement containing performance-related remuneration 
provisions. However, such clauses have not always been effectively imple-
mented. As previously noted (Lansbury and Baird, 2002: 111), experiments 
with performance-based pay or monetary bonus have generally been of a 
“short term nature and have failed due to perceptions of unfairness, poor 
management or corruption of the schemes”.
All of the Ford enterprise agreements contain a merit allocation system 
for salaried employees whereby half of their potential salary increases were 
linked to the achievement of specific goals, work output, quality improve-
ment, customer feedback and contribution to team work. Such a system 
does not apply to non-salaried employees, among whom levels of unioni-
zation are highest. This is because the unions are against a pay system that 
would potentially generate competition among employees. Similarly, the 
early Toyota EBAs contained performance-based pay components, which 
would be paid to employees upon the achievement of various productiv-
ity  indicators. However, this system ceased to operate in 1994. Although 
none of the GM-Holden EBAs contained at-risk pay components, the 1992 
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agreement provided for quarterly bonuses based on customer satisfaction.
GM-Holden employees are given non-monetary rewards for the achievement 
of specified attendance targets and there are various targets for production
output and quality, although these are not connected in any way to 
 remuneration or any other rewards. These provisions are not  specified in 
any GM-Holden agreement or award.
ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE
One of the main changes since the introduction of enterprise bargaining 
has been the presence of clauses in agreements that affirm the commitment
of the parties to the collective bargaining process. This became more 
 important to the unions in the sector following the passage of the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996, which contained provisions for individual, non-union 
employment contracts, known as Australian Workplace Agreements 
(AWAs) that can replace awards and enterprise bargaining agreements, 
however only the Ford and GM-Holden EBAs specifically exclude the use 
of AWAs.
There are strong similarities between GM-Holden, Ford, Mitsubishi and 
Toyota regarding provisions contained in their EBAs that relate to union 
rights and responsibilities. When a provision is included in an EBA by one 
company, such provision will often “flow on” to other companies in the 
next round of bargaining. However, there is still some variation between 
the companies. Hence, although each of the current EBAs provide for the 
recognition by the company of unions, there is considerable divergence in 
the content of such clauses. In regard to the issue of right of entry for union 
officials, for example, there are differences between the four assemblers.
Mitsubishi and Adecco have carefully phrased clauses which could be 
interpreted as placing greater restriction on officials, while Toyota and Ford 
are silent on the matter.
Despite the provisions contained in the various agreements, the AMWU 
claims that its officials have virtually unrestricted access to employees in 
the assembly plants. Yet according to some respondents in our interviews, 
Mitsubishi and GM-Holden are regarded as more accommodating as far 
as “right of entry” arrangements are concerned, in comparison with Ford 
and Toyota, where a 24-hour notice period is strictly enforced. However, 
union officials seeking access to Mitsubishi must comply with a code of 
conduct before entering the site. Unlike the other companies, recent Ford 
and GM-Holden agreements contain initiatives regarding special provisions 
for female union representatives, with Ford establishing a pilot program for 
female deputy shop stewards and GM-Holden allowing the establishment 
of two female deputy shop steward positions.
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All four auto companies have established workplace-based consulta-
tive mechanisms, such as plant consultative committees, to enable the 
parties to discuss a broad array of issues. According to industry representa-
tives, these types of consultative mechanisms facilitate the most effective 
avenues of communication. Working parties and single-issue committees 
are often established to deal with transient or ad hoc issues. For example, 
Mitsubishi has established a “calendar committee” to deal with the rostering 
of days off, and the most recent Toyota agreement allows for a “problem 
resolution committee”. Furthermore, although the companies apparently 
established non-trades and trades training committees as a result of the 
structural efficiency principle in the late 1980s, only Ford appears to have 
specifically affirmed the role of such committees in their EBAs. Such issues 
are now encompassed at GM-Holden through its state-based consultative 
committees. There are other consultation arrangements in place amongst 
the assemblers that are not captured in enterprise agreements. One exam-
ple is work group meetings, which are held at the end of every shift at
GM-Holden. Suggestion schemes have also been introduced at GM-Holden 
and Mitsubishi, with some success at both companies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
To what degree has employment relations in the Australian auto 
 assembly sector been influenced by the coexisting forces of globalization 
and enterprise bargaining? On the one hand, it might be expected that 
 globalization will produce greater convergence amongst the four producers. 
On the other hand, enterprise based bargaining may facilitate increasing 
divergence between companies, and therefore contribute to more  pronounced 
intra-industry variation. Furthermore, national institutional  factors could be 
thought to mediate the influences of globalization and shape the nature of 
employment relations outcomes. 
In terms of work organization, there has been a clear convergence 
around the concept, if not the practice, of lean production. Three of the four 
assemblers profess lean production strategies, however, consistent with the 
arguments of Kochan et al. (1997), there are differences in the extent to 
which lean production principles have been implemented and utilized by the 
four assemblers. This is evident in relation to teamwork, where consider-
able variation in the composition and purpose of teams is evident. In three 
of the four companies, staffing patterns have been reasonably resistant to 
change, with the full-time, permanent employment model being maintained 
by the union until very recently. It is at Mitsubishi, the poorest performer 
in the market, where the most marked staffing divergence has occurred, 
with the AMWU relinquishing permanence to agency hire in return for 
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job and market security for the other employees. Skill formation reflects 
a strong sectoral influence, with common industry training standards 
and all companies paying according to skill. However, it is in total wage 
 outcomes that another divergence occurs and again it is in Mitsubishi 
where the industry pattern breaks down. Enterprise bargaining outcomes 
for Mitsubishi employees started to fall away in the late 1990s and have 
not recovered to the levels of the other three companies. Finally, in terms 
of enterprise governance, again the union has maintained a reasonable 
consistent approach, although it is not always codified in the enterprise 
agreements in the same way. 
Convergence has therefore occurred in production systems, skill 
formation and enterprise governance while divergence has emerged in 
remuneration and staffing practices between the four auto assemblers. 
Enterprise bargaining was anticipated to result in different employment 
relations outcomes yet, arguably, the influence of strong union organiza-
tion has prevented greater variation between the companies. Locke (1992) 
argues that the historical and contextual diversity in which actors operate 
will result in different responses when presented with the same challenges. 
He emphasizes local socioeconomic conditions and the politics of strategic 
choice as important factors in determining the extent of intra-national, or 
in this case, intra-industry change. One state is home to the least  successful
company (Mitsubishi) and the second most effective (GM-Holden) in terms 
of market share, while the operations of the most successful (Toyota) and 
also the second least effective (Ford) are in another state suggests that local 
socioeconomic conditions may not be as significant a factor as is argued 
by Locke. Another factor that Locke attributes to variation, that may hold 
greater weight in explaining variation in the automotive employment 
 relations, relates to the strategies available to the parties in alleviating 
market pressures.
Increased competition from overseas producers has been cited in 
 support of employment relations reforms, but the direction this change has 
taken has been shaped by the decisions available to employers and unions. 
For example, employers in the sector do not appear to have strongly resisted 
the demands of unions regarding high wage claims (at least by Australian 
standards) in enterprise agreement negotiations. However, a trade-off for 
generous wage outcomes appears to have come in the form of greater 
numerical flexibility. Indeed, the use of precarious employment and provi-
sion for redundancy appears to be the main strategies that the companies 
have chosen to alleviate the competitive pressures that globalization has 
placed on Australian automotive assemblers. 
While there are differences between the employment relations practices 
of the four assemblers, national-level institutional factors appear to have 
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prevented greater divergence occurring. The residue of centralization, the 
strength of trade unions in the sector, and even bargaining coordination 
between employers, have resulted in the maintenance of continuity in 
 relation to union recognition and support for trade union membership. There 
are also similarities between the companies in areas such as working hours, 
training and redundancy provisions. 
The longer term future of the Australian automotive industry remains 
uncertain due to import competition, changes in government policies on 
tariff protection and fluctuations in the exchange rate of the Australian 
 dollar, as well as whether globalize companies are willing to make  long-
term investments in the domestic automotive assembly sector. Given the 
small size of the Australian market, the long-term viability of the industry 
depends on the strategies adopted by the companies to produce vehicles 
of world-class quality and to win access to overseas markets for their 
products. As has been the case to date, enterprise bargaining will continue 
to be an important indicator of the extent that companies seek to integrate
 employment relations into such strategies. However, the continuing 
 influence of national systems of employment relations in an increasingly 
globalize industry remains to be seen.
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RÉSUMÉ
La négociation décentralisée dans une industrie qui se 
 mondialise : le cas de l’industrie de l’automobile en Australie
Cet essai cherche à vérifier de quelle façon le secteur de l’assemblage 
des automobiles en Australie a réagi à la double pression de la mondialisation 
croissante et de la négociation à l’échelle de l’entreprise. L’industrie de la 
fabrication automobile a joué un rôle majeur dans l’économie australienne 
et, de plus, elle représente l’une des industries d’importation les plus 
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 importantes. Le secteur inclut plusieurs centaines de fournisseurs de  pièces
et quatre constructeurs automobiles: Ford, GM-Holden, Mitsubishi et 
Toyota; les deux premiers sont de propriété américaine, alors que les deux 
derniers sont possédés par des Japonais. La nature compétitive croissante de 
l’industrie automobile à l’échelle mondiale, les profits qui s’effritent et une 
diminution du ratio des exportations sur les importations dans l’industrie 
australienne ont incité les gouvernements, les manufacturiers et les syndicats 
à concevoir des façons de rendre l’industrie plus efficace.
Un changement majeur qui a affecté l’industrie australienne de 
 l’automobile au cours de la dernière décennie fut le glissement d’un  système 
fortement centralisé de relations industrielles vers une forme plus décen-
tralisée de négociation collective sur la base de l’entreprise. Cette dernière 
implique une négociation directe des conditions d’emploi et des salaires entre 
les employeurs et leurs employés, qui est officialisée par des conventions 
collectives à l’échelle de l’entreprise. Le caractère fortement syndiqué de 
l’industrie australienne de l’automobile implique que les syndicats négocient 
des ententes au nom des salariés non syndiqués dans l’entreprise. 
D’un côté, on peut s’attendre à ce que la mondialisation introduise un 
degré de convergence plus élevé entre les manufacturiers. D’un autre côté, 
la négociation sur la base de l’entreprise peut entraîner une divergence plus 
grande entre les sociétés et, par conséquent, contribuer à une variation intra-
industrie plus prononcée. De plus, des facteurs institutionnels nationaux 
peuvent être perçus comme un frein aux influences de la mondialisation et 
ils peuvent façonner la nature des résultats des relations du travail. 
En termes d’organisation du travail, il existe une compréhension 
 commune du concept, sinon de la pratique, de la production « allégée » (lean 
production). Trois des quatre constructeurs mettent de l’avant des stratégies 
de production allégée; cependant, il existe des différences en pratique quant 
à l’ampleur de l’application de ces principes chez les quatre constructeurs. 
C’est particulièrement le cas lorsqu’on considère le travail d’équipe, où les 
différences sont importantes au plan de la composition et des objectifs des 
équipes. Dans trois des quatre sociétés, les modes de dotation en personnel 
ont résisté au changement, en conservant le modèle de l’emploi permanent 
et à plein temps, maintenu en place par les syndicats jusqu’à récemment. 
C’est à la société Mitsubishi, l’acteur le plus pauvre dans ce marché, où la 
divergence la plus grande au plan de la dotation s’est produite, alors que 
les syndicats abandonnaient la permanence à une agence de recrutement en 
retour d’une sécurité d’emploi et de marché pour les autres employés. 
La formation professionnelle reflète l’influence forte du secteur, avec 
des normes de formation communes pour l’industrie et des salaires payés 
par toutes les entreprises selon les compétences. Cependant, c’est au plan 
de la rémunération globale que d’autres différences se produisent et, 
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encore là, c’est la société Mitsubishi qui fait bande à part. Les effets de la 
négociation à l’échelle de l’entreprise chez les salariés de Mitsubishi ont 
commencé à décliner vers la fin des années 1990 et ils ne sont pas revenus 
au niveau atteint par les trois autres sociétés. En termes de gouvernance 
d’entreprise, le syndicat a de nouveau maintenu une approche homogène 
et raisonnable, quoique cela n’apparaisse pas de la même manière dans les 
accords d’entreprise. 
La convergence s’est donc produite dans les systèmes de production,
dans la formation et dans la gouvernance d’entreprise, alors que la 
 divergence entre les quatre constructeurs est apparue dans les pratiques 
de dotation et de rémunération. La concurrence accrue des compétiteurs 
d’outre-mer a été invoquée en guise de support aux réformes des relations 
du travail, mais la direction qu’a pris ce changement a été influencée par 
des décisions à la portée de la main des employeurs et des syndicats. En 
effet, le recours à l’emploi précaire et une disposition touchant l’excédent 
de main-d’œuvre sont devenues les principales stratégies retenues par les 
sociétés pour atténuer les pressions concurrentielles de la mondialisation 
sur les constructeurs d’automobiles en Australie. Alors que des différences
persistent au plan des pratiques de relations du travail chez les quatre 
constructeurs, des facteurs d’ordre institutionnel à l’échelle du pays sont 
venus freiner l’apparition d’une divergence plus prononcée. Le reliquat de 
la centralisation, la force des syndicats du secteur et même une coordination 
des négociations chez les employeurs du secteur ont contribué au maintien 
d’une continuité eu égard à la reconnaissance syndicale et au support apporté 
au membership. Il existe également des similitudes entre les sociétés dans 
les domaines des heures de travail, de la formation professionnelle et des 
dispositions relatives au surplus de main-d’œuvre. 
L’avenir à long terme de l’industrie de l’automobile en Australie 
demeure aléatoire, du à la concurrence de l’importation, à des  changements 
dans la politique gouvernementale sur la protection des tarifs et aux 
 fluctuations du taux de change du dollar australien. Également,  l’incertitude 
persiste quant à savoir si les sociétés mondialisées sont disposées à investir 
en longue période dans le secteur domestique de l’automobile. Étant donné 
la petitesse du marché australien, la survie à long terme de l’industrie 
dépend aussi des stratégies mises de l’avant par les entreprises en vue de 
la production de véhicules de classe mondiale et pour l’obtention d’un 
accès aux marchés d’outre-mer pour leurs produits. Comme ce fut le cas à 
ce jour, la négociation sur la base de l’entreprise continuera à demeurer un 
indicateur du degré auquel les sociétés chercheront à intégrer les relations 
du travail à de telles stratégies. Cependant, l’influence persistante des 
systèmes nationaux de relations industrielles dans une industrie de plus en 
plus mondialisée demeure une inconnue. 
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